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Abstract. We propose a flow-insensitive analysis that prunes out por-
tions of code which are irrelevant to a specified set of data-flow paths.
Our approach is fast and scalable, in addition to being able to generate
a certificate as an audit for the computed result. We have implemented
our technique in a tool called DSlicer and applied it to a set of 10600
real-world Android applications. Results are conclusive, we found out
that the program code can be significantly reduced by 36% on average
with respect to a specified set of data leak paths.
1 Introduction
Applying static analysis naively may result in exploring parts of code which
are irrelevant to a property of interest. We propose a lightweight approach for
slicing programs that can be invoked by other tools as a preprocessing phase.
As slicing criterion, our technique accepts a set of data-flow paths and returns,
as result, a reduced program which is free from parts of code irrelevant to the
specified set of paths. Hence, the resulting program is guaranteed to include all
the specified data-flows. This can benefit a more precise (heavyweight) data-flow
analysis allowing it to operate on a reduced version of the original program.
The effectiveness of our approach is the result of its compact representation,
allowing it to efficiently encode programs without sacrificing soundness with
respect to the slicing criterion. Moreover, our technique can produce an inde-
pendently checkable certificate attesting its soundness, hence providing a formal
argument for trust.
We implemented our approach in a tool called DSlicer and applied it to
10600 real-world Android applications. Results are conclusive, they show that
our analysis is efficient (runs in 5 seconds on average), scales up to large programs
(containing >40000 methods) and dramatically reduces the program size. We
found out that the number of methods in the program can be reduced by 36%
on average. This represents a significant saving for potential client tools.
Example. To illustrate our approach, let us consider the simple Java example
in Figure 1(a). In the function main, an instance of the class C, defined in
Figure 1(b), is created and its methods m1, m3, m4 and m5 are consecutively
invoked. The function source returns some private (integer) information, it could
be for example the identifier of a mobile device. The function sink takes an integer
as parameter and sends it out, for instance via the Internet or writes it on the
extenal storage. Private information is leaked if there is a path from source
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1 class A
2 {
3 public static void main()
4 {
5 C o = new C();
6 o.m1();
7 o.m3();
8 o.m4();
9 o.m5();
10 }
11 }
(a)
SR
C.m2.v
C.m2.r
C.m1.v
C.v1
C.v2
SK
0
(c)
1 class C
2 {
3 private int v1 , v2;
4
5 public void m1(){
6 int v = m2();
7 sink (0);
8 }
9 public void m2(){
10 int v = source ();
11 return(v);
12 }
13 public void m3(){
14 v1 = source ();
15 }
16 public void m4(){
17 v2 = v1;
18 }
19 public void m5(){
20 sink(v2);
21 }
22 }
(b)
Fig. 1. Example illustrating the translation of a program to an assignment graph
to sink. We want to identify the methods that are not relevant to information
leaks, i.e., no path from source to sink is missed if these methods are removed
from the code. This cannot be achieved by simply considering the call graph.
For example sink is invoked by m1 as well as source which is transitively called
through m2. However, there is no connection between them, thus m1 and m2
are not involved in any information leak. On the other hand, m4 neither invokes
source nor sink, but it is involved in an information leak. It consists of copying
the private information stored in v1 (generated via m3) to v2 which is then
leaked after calling m5. To detect such leaks, our approach proceeds as follows.
First, the program is flattened using a flow-insensitive representation that we call
assignment graph, this is illustrated in Figure 1(c). Nodes of the graph represent
variables in the program and edges model the information flow (assignments)
between them. The procedures source and sink are respectively represented via
nodes SR and SK. Their implementation is not relevant for the analysis. A local
variable v in a method m, which is a member of a class C, is represented in the
graph by C.m.v. For example, the assignment in method m2 at line 10 is modeled
in the graph via C.m2.v ← SR. A field (member) v of a class C is modeled via
C.v. As an example, the assignment at line 17 is modeled via C.v2 ← C.v1.
Hence, for two different objects O1 and O2 belonging to the same class C, the
field access O1.v and O2.v are mapped to the same identifier C.v. While this
representation is too coarse as the access to the fields of all object instances of
the same class in a program are mapped to a unique node in the graph, it has
the advantage of soundly approximating aliases when objects are dereferenced.
A return statement is modelled via an assignment from the returned variable to
a special variable r. The return statement at line 11 corresponds to C.m2.v →
C.m2.r in the graph. Finally, a call assignment to a variable v is represented via
an edge from the special variable r of the callee to the return-to variable v of
the caller. Line 6 in the code is translated to C.m2.r → C.m1.v.
To find out which methods are relevant to information leakage paths, it
suffices to go through the paths leading from sources SR to sinks SK in the
assignment graph and pick up the variables appearing along them. Any method
in which those variables appear is considered to be relevant. Back to our example,
we only have the path SR→ C.v1→ C.v2→ SK. The identifiers C.v1 and C.v2
respectively correspond to the fields v1 and v2 of class C. They appear (are used)
in the methods m3, m4 and m5, hence they are the relevant methods. Methods
m1 and m2 can then be safely discarded. In the next section, we cover the
translation from a program to an assignment graph in more details.
2 Assignment Graph: a Compact Representation
Our analysis is applied to object oriented programs, therefore we need to account
for the main features distinguishing them from simple imperative programs. We
use a Jimple-like [21] intermediary representation which allows to encode most of
the language constructs using a minimal set of three-address-based instructions.
It has been shown that the whole instruction set of widely deployed virtual
machines such as JVM and Dalvik can be encoded in Jimple [21,5].
To ease the presentation, we omit the technical details and consider a core
set of the most representative instructions. All the remaining instructions are
variants derived from the core set. We do not consider branching instructions
as they are irrelevant to our analysis. Table 1 illustrates the main instructions
considered in our study. Column “Syntax” gives the syntax of an instruction
and column “Translation” provides its translation in the assignment graph. We
have seen in the previous section how instructions const to var, var to var are
translated. Instructions uni op and bin op respectively represent unary and bi-
nary (arithmetic or logic) operations. Their semantics is irrelevant for us, we are
just interested in the information flow they induce. Hence, we have an edge from
the operand on the right hand side to the lvalue in case of uni op and two edges
in case of bin op, modelling the information flow from both operands. Column
Instruction Syntax Context Translation
const to var v := n v ∈ m, m ∈ C C.m.v ← n
var to var v1 := v2 v1, v2 ∈ m, m ∈ C C.m.v1 ← C.m.v2
uni op v1 := op v2 v1, v2 ∈ m, m ∈ C C.m.v1 ← C.m.v2
bin op v1 := v2 op v3 v1, v2, v3 ∈ m, m ∈ C C.m.v1 ← C.m.v2
C.m.v1 ← C.m.v3
var to array v1[v2] := v3 v1, v2, v3 ∈ m, m ∈ C C.m.v1 ← C.m.v3
array to var v1 := v2[v3] v1, v2, v3 ∈ m, m ∈ C C.m.v1 ← C.m.v2
var to field o.f := v class(o) = C C.f ← C′.m.v
v ∈ m, m ∈ C′
field to var v := o.f class(o) = C C′.m.v ← C.f
v ∈ m, m ∈ C′
call v := call m′, [v0, . . . , vn] v, v0, . . . , vn ∈ m i ∈ [0, n]
param(m′) = [x0, . . . , xn] C′.m′.xi ← C.m.vi
m ∈ C,m′ ∈ C′ C.m.v ← C′.m′.r
return return v v ∈ m, m ∈ C C.m.r ← C.m.v
Table 1. Instruction syntax and their corresponding representations in the as-
signment graph.
“Context” provides the scope of the different variables, v ∈ m indicates that v
is local (belongs) to method m.
In case of an assignment to an array (var to array), we conservatively assume
that the whole array is affected. Keeping track of array indexes requires a non-
trivial analysis by itself. We similarly model the opposite case (array to var).
For assignments to (from) object fields var to field (field to var) having the
form o.f , we use the class C of the object o as a prefix for the field f . As
mentioned in the previous section, all dereferences of a given field f of various
objects which are instances of the same class C are mapped to a unique node
in the graph, namely C.f . This has the advantage of soundly approximating
aliases.
For method invocation (call), the receiver object is provided as first argument
in case the method is virtual. Hence v := call m′, v0, . . . , vn in Table 1 is
equivalent to v := v0.m
′(v1 . . . , vn) (m′ is virtual). The translation of such a
case consists of adding an edge from each actual parameter of the call to the
corresponding formal one. The list of formal parameters of the method m′ is
obtained via param. We also need to assign the returned value to v. Thus, we
introduce an edge leading from the special variable r of the callee (m′) to v.
Finally, for a return statement of the form return v, we simply add an edge
from v to the special variable r of the related method.
A key feature of object oriented programs is dynamic dispatch due to poly-
morphism. The resolution of some method calls can only be done at runtime
depending on the type of the receiver object. Taking this into account is crucial
for the soundness of our analysis. Hence, we build an over-approximation of the
call graph using class-hierarchy-based type estimation of receiver objects [19].
3 Slice Computation
In this section we describe our approach for computing a slice with respect to
a set of sources SR and sinks SK. The slicing criterion is all data-flow paths
r ; k such that r ∈ SR and k ∈ SK.
This is achieved via algorithm ComputeSlice (Algorithm 1) which takes as
parameters an assignment graph G, a set of sources SR and a set of sinks SK.
Sources and sinks are in general API functions. Strictly speaking, SR is the set
of identifiers appearing in the program as parameters or return variables of a
source API. Similarly, SK is the set of identifiers appearing in the program as
parameters of a sink API.
The initial step of Algorithm ComputeSlice consists of marking all the source
identifiers (nodes) in the graph G with +, as illustrated at line 4. It then performs
a forward propagation of the marking to the successors of the already marked
nodes (lines 5-9). Next, sinks are marked with the symbol − (lines 11-12). The
marking is then propagated backward, but the propagation is only restricted
to predecessor nodes which have been already marked with + in the forward
phase (lines 13-17). The relevant identifiers are the ones marked with both +
and − (line 18). Intuitively speaking, these are the nodes reachable from sources
and reaching sinks. In our implementation, we offer the option for retrieving an
exclusively forward or backward slice.
Our slicing is coarse grained, and conservative as we keep an entire method
if at least one of the symbols used in it is relevant. Some methods are affected
through their local variables (including parameters), see line 19. Other methods
are affected through object field access. In the latter case, if an identifier of the
form c.f is relevant, it implies that any access to the field f of some object o
which is instantiated from c is relevant. Consequently, any method in which o.f
appears is considered as relevant (line 20). Finally the set of relevant methods
is returned.
Certification. A key question that may arise is: how can we trust the result
(soundness) of the analysis? For this we return a certificate which can be inde-
pendently checked to confirm or refute the result of the analysis. The certificate
is made of two parts:
– Translation certificate: it consists of the assignment graph. It allows to
check that the program is faithfully translated according to the rules pre-
sented in Table 1. The checking is quite straightforward, it suffices to iterate
over the instructions of each method and check that their corresponding
translations are present in the graph.
– Analysis certificate: consists of a mapping assigning each node of the
graph to the marking (+, −) generated during the slice computation. Check-
ing the certificate in this case simply consists of verifying that every source is
Algorithm 1: ComputeSlice
Input: assignment graph G, source set SR, sink set SK
Output: set of procedure identifiers
1 Var set L;
2 L := {id | id ∈ SR};
3 foreach id ∈ L do
4 mark(id,G,+);
5 while L 6= ∅ do
6 select and remove an identifier id from L;
7 foreach (id, id′) ∈ G s.t. ¬marked(id′, G,+) do
8 mark(id′, G,+);
9 L := L ∪ {id′};
10 L := {id | id ∈ SK};
11 foreach id ∈ L do
12 mark(id,G,−);
13 while L 6= ∅ do
14 pick up an identifier id from L;
15 foreach (id′, id) ∈ G s.t. marked(id′, G,+) ∧ ¬marked(id′, G,−) do
16 mark(id′, G,−);
17 L := L ∪ {id′}
18 ids := {id | id ∈ nodes(G) ∧marked(id,G,+) ∧marked(id,G,−)};
19 via locals := {m | ∃c ∃v c.m.v ∈ ids};
20 via fields := {m | ∃o ∃f o.f used in m ∧ class(o) = c ∧ c.f ∈ ids};
21 relevant := via locals ∪ via fields;
22 return relevant
marked with +, every sink is marked with−, and for any edge n1 → n2, check
that marked(n1,+) ⇒ marked(n2,+) and marked(n2,−) ⇒ marked(n1,−).
This is carried out in a single linear pass as opposed to the slice computation
which requires a forward and backward pass. We provide an implementation
of a certificate checker in our tool.
4 DSlicer: Implementation and Experiments
We implemented our approach in a tool called DSlicer, which is written in Python
and uses Androguard1 as front-end for parsing and decompiling Android appli-
cations. It takes as input an Android application in bytecode format (APK)
and a configuration file containing the sources and sinks to be considered in the
analysis. One can tailor the analysis by modifying the configuration file. As out-
put, DSlicer returns a list of methods that are relevant (irrelevant) to the slicing
criterion, (optionally) with an accompanying certificate. It also has an option
for generating a new application (APK) that is free from irrelevant methods.
1 https://github.com/androguard
In checking mode, DSlicer accepts an application and a certificate and answers
whether the certificate is valid with respect to the application taken as input.
Experiments. We performed experiments on a large set of 10600 Android
applications collected from various sources, including the Google Play store. As
slicing criterion, we used the set of sources and sinks provided with Flowdroid
[4]. Therefore, the considered criterion is potential data leak paths.
Figure 2 illustrates the results in terms of analysis run-time (a) and size re-
duction percentage (b) per application. The first diagram (a) clearly shows that
the run-time of the analysis is linear in the application size (number of meth-
ods). Moreover, most of the applications are analyzed in less than 200 seconds.
The diagram on the right-hand side (b) represents the gain in application size
(irrelevant methods) in function of the method number. We can see that the per-
centage of methods that can be discarded is between 15% and 65% for most of
the applications and tends to stabilize between 30% and 40% when the number
of methods increases. Applications are of decent size (3914 methods on average)
with some of them containing up to 49146 methods. The overall running time
of DSlicer is 1682 seconds in the worst case, but runs in 5 seconds on average.
This is not a significant overhead for potential clients which are far more time
consuming. Finally, the most important result is the potential reduction of code
size thanks to the present analysis. We found out that 36% of the methods are
in general irrelevant to the considered set of sources and sinks. Hence, they can
be safely discarded. Such an important reduction can significantly benefit client
tools.
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Fig. 2. Time taken by the analysis per application (a) and application size re-
duction percentage (b) in function of method number
5 Related work
Our work is at the intersection of several topics: program slicing, data-flow anal-
ysis, and program certification.
Program slicing was originally proposed by Weiser [23]. While the initial
proposal defined a slice as a set of statements that might influence a program
point of interest (criterion), a dynamic variant was examined as well [3].
Slicing has been applied for various purposes: program debugging [2], test-
ing [13] comprehension [15], re-use [7] and re-engineering [17]. There are also
semantics-preserving variants [12], allowing changes to the program syntax as
long as the program semantics is preserved. In the context of software model
checking, path slicing was also proposed [14]. Rasthofer et al applied slicing for
extracting runtime values to increase the recall of existing static analysis [16].
While previous work requires program-semantics to be preserved, our require-
ment is more relaxed. We only need data-paths to be preserved.
The assignment-graph-based representation used in our approach is inspired
by the work of Sundaresan et al [19] on the estimation of object dynamic types.
Our application makes a more general usage of that representation as we consider
more cases for flows such as arithmetic and logic expressions.
Flow-insensitive analyses have been well studied in the literature [18,9,11,6,1].
All these approaches are related to pointer analysis. The technique presented by
Adam et al [1] is the closest to our work. They run a scalable, control-flow-
insensitive pointer analysis to obtain a conservative over-approximation of the
dataflow facts and the statements that must be processed by a client analysis.
In addition to being specific to pointer analysis, their approach is targeting C
programs. Our method deals with object oriented programs which have more
complicated features such as dynamic dispatching, etc.
There are many data-flow analysis tools for finding information leaks: Flow-
droid [4], Taintdroid [8], Amandroid [22], Andromeda [20] and Droidsafe [10].
They represent potential clients for DSlicer as they perform a quite precise anal-
ysis. Reducing the size of the code to be analysed can boost their performance.
6 Conclusion and Further Work
We presented a lightweight slicing approach for object oriented programs that
can detect and discard parts of code that are irrelevant to a specified set of data-
flow paths. A distinguishing feature of our approach lies in the compact repre-
sentation it uses, allowing it to efficiently encode programs without sacrificing
soundness with respect to the slicing criterion. Moreover, our analysis generates
an independently checkable certificate attesting the soundness of the returned
result. We have implemented our approach in a tool called DSlicer and applied
it to 10600 real-world applications. Results show that our approach is effective
as it runs in 5 seconds for most of the programs, scales up to large programs
(> 40000 methods) and significantly reduces application code size (number of
methods) by up to 36% on average. This is a pertinent optimization that could
significantly benefit potential client tools.
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